Festive season for the ANC in WC? No leave available

Tis the season to be jolly but with the Mangaung hangover, the ANC in the Western Cape has its work cut out. There are approximately 56 weeks left to the next general elections which will probably take place on 27 April 2014, marking the 20^th anniversary of the 1994 first democratic elections in South Africa. 

The primary priority for the ANC in the Western Cape though should not be these elections; this should be the second priority. The primary goal and priority for the leadership should be: unity in the organisation in the province.

Post-mortems of processes are sometimes useful. The previous blog entry suggested that the nominations for Mangaung process, of the top 6 particularly, should be seen as an exercise of democracy. However, this democratic exercise was not seen in a positive light, especially as articulated by the media. Factions, splits and public spats could be nuanced to be viewed as democracy at work but unless this is communicated to the media and the public at large, as a healthy democratic process, it spells only one thing: division.

For example, while the proposal for a 10 year term debate between the Chairperson of the Province and the Secretary could have taken place within the democratic space that the ANC affords, people not privy to the dynamics of the organisation will not see it for what it is: healthy debate. In fact, for those outside the organisation, the media and the swing vote the ANC (hopefully) wishes to court, it simply is remnant of the (supposed) factionalism and fighting that characterised the ANC in the province during the Rasool-Skwatsha period. The media and the swing-voter would suggest: “ah! Look the Chairperson and the Secretary are at each other’s throat again!” All sorts of interpretations are then articulated: race, factionalism and division.

But again, if communications had been high on the priority list of the turn-around strategy in the province then the healthy debate, which it most probably was, is coached in such a manner that the media and the voters at large are exposed to. “Look,” the media and voters would say, “there’s healthy debate in the ANC. Does such debate occur in other parties?”

Yet this “healthy debate” is not communicated to the media and swing-voters. Even worse, it is not communicated to ANC constituencies. (The first principle in any communications strategy is to communicate to your own organisation/constituency first). The “debate” therefore took place with the backdrop of a postponed (and late) conference, which was split down the middle and which was characterised as being rather exemplary of an anti-Zuma atmosphere that exists in the province at large, given the results. (As an aside, something is seriously amiss when the smallest province in the organisation has to postpone its conference because of administrative hiccups).

Therefore, once again, inadvertently, the national politics (Rasool for Mbeki, Skwatsha for Zuma) of a couple of years ago has been used to create splits in the province. What should be healthy debate and democracy at work simply becomes deep seated divisions because leaders fail to communicate to members of the organisation, fail to meet the media and thus fail to put out the right message to voters at large.

Unity in the province thus becomes a wound that needs to be healed even though the injury should never have occurred in the first place. The next provincial conference happens in February 2015 when branches will judge the current PEC capable or not of taking the province forward. This PEC would have a very tough time trying to convince branches that unity is what they achieved if the conference was to be held this coming February. Will they be able to convince voters by April 2014 that unity in the ANC in the province is what they achieved?

The results of the bi-elections in Ward 22 in the Metro, scheduled for 30 January 2013, will certainly indicate the kind of dent the ANC will make in the general elections of 2014.

A week is a long time in politics but only if the odds are favourable in one’s favour. As said before, unlike the other 8 provinces, the ANC in the Western Cape cannot wait for post-Mangaung or for possible reshuffles in early next year to start working. It needs to work doubly hard. We had to start yesterday. We don’t have time on our side.   

Tis truly the season to be jolly but for the ANC in the Western Cape, it is the season to be hard at work. Leave should therefore be denied.

ANC WC: Diversity deepens democracy

Celebrating its centenary as the eldest democratic organisation on the continent of Africa, the African National Congress is preparing its delegates for its 53^rd National Conference to be held in its birth-place, Mangaung, in December. The majority of the leadership and membership is hoping that, like conferences before, Mangaung will give direction on matters of policy.

Anyone who understands the ANC, has been groomed as an ANC cadre, would know that the collective is paramount in the ANC. The persons who emerge as leaders in the ANC, post-Mangaung, would therefore not really be able to single-handedly change policy. The collective determines policy and it is therefore the collective that matters. The collective is supreme because the ANC is a truly democratic, African organisation; where the rights of the community surpass the popularity of individuals.

In the lead up to this Conference therefore democracy is at work in the ANC. Already branches, regions and provinces are vigorously engaging the outcomes of the National General Council (NGC) held this past June. Coupled with these debates and discussions on matters of policy, is the question of who will lead the organisation for the next 5 years. Unfortunately, given the loud voices of some commentators and some in the media, certain members and branches have been pre-occupied with nominations, not only for leadership but specifically the top 6.

Again, displaying their complete ignorance at how the ANC operates, they concentrate on the top 6 executive positions ignoring the rest of the National Executive Committee, the second highest ranking decision making body of the ANC between National Conferences. So fixated on the top 6, these “pundits” even ignore the fact that the NEC (again not the top 6) elects the highest operational organ of the ANC, the National Working Committee, which manages the day-to-day operations of the organisation (again not only the top 6).

Be all of this as it may, as a fundamentally democratic organisation and steeped in African philosophy, the ANC allows for even those members, who with blinkers focus on the top 6, to bloom. Though this narrow focus on the top 6 may be unfortunate, the ANC as a collective, as democratic as it is, tolerates these members, at this juncture when nominations are open, to freely, without fear or favour, debate who should lead the movement.

And yet this free discussion and democratic debate on leadership, albeit only the top 6, in Western Cape is described as “bruising”. Would the election between Barak Obama and Mitt Romney be described as “bruising”? Was the election of Ivan Meyer as Democratic Alliance leader in the Western Cape “bruising”? Is the unopposed nomination of Helen Zille, as DA leader, at the DA congress later this month described as bruising? If anything, one could argue that because Meyer and Zille are elected unopposed that it is democracy itself that is being bruised in the DA Western Cape election; but no such article. Why is it that this writer tries to describe a free and democratic process as having a “bruising” effect?

No doubt, it could be that the mantra that “no good could ever come from the ANC” again prevails in this instance. Some within our country are hell bent on describing even a democratic election in Mangaung as something which can only be divisive, factionalist and therefore “bruising”. Never mind that there is healthy debate on the leadership, albeit on the top 6 only. Never mind that democracy, as in Polokwane, will blossom again in Mangaung. Never mind that the Western Cape, maybe more than any other province, has the most diverse opinion on the top 6 and that democracy within the ANC Western Cape allows for this diverse views. Some remain convicted on portraying the ANC, especially in the Western Cape, negatively.

Even the leader of the ANC in the Western Cape has not imposed his candidate on the province. Do we get positive reporting on this? No. The debate, the discussions, the democracy at play is simply divisive, these would articulate. “It is factionalist”, they continue. It is simply bruising!

From a purely theoretical point of view, presidents with a two-term limit are always much more effective in their second term. They are able to be decisive because they do not have to please constituencies to get re-elected. This is the simple reason why I would support a second term.

Yet I am sure that many others in the ANC, who support a second term for President Zuma, will support and defend the right of any ANC member, in good-standing, to nominate whoever he or she wishes to be president of the ANC. Just as we support and nominate our candidate, Jacob Zuma, so too do we acknowledge the right and freedom of any member to support and nominate any candidate albeit that that person is different from ours. The ANC taught us democracy, the ANC taught us to defend the rights of others and if we claim to be members of this noble organisation we will defend another’s rights.

However, those who describe the democratic process as bruising must know that whoever wins in Mangaung, no matter who the top 6 is, that the majority of ordinary members of the ANC will rally behind our leadership and we will support each other. Winners and losers will share equally in the victory of Mangaung because we would have defended and strengthened democracy. The majority of us in the ANC will be resolved that on 20 December 2012 we will respect the will of the branches of our organisation, as beautifully diverse as they are, and acknowledge that democracy has been the winner.

Even more so, we will resolve to allow for the democracy exercised in Mangaung to deepen our democracy and strengthen our own unity, as we unite behind our own leadership right here in the Western Cape!

Ward 88: A watershed moment

*Disclaimer: let me commend those who actually worked in Ward 88 in the last few weeks. I was not there and did not do anything. Therefore, I do not have a right to criticise and this brief will certainly not be criticism of anything or anyone. It simply wishes to reflect from an “objective” distance.

Let’s take a look at the figures

From the results released by the Independent Electoral Commission, the ANC lost Ward 88 to the DA by 6% i.e. by 462 votes. For convenience, a breakdown of the figures is given below:

Voting station no.:	Voting station:	Votes Cast:	Voter turnout: (Registered voters)	ANC Votes: (% of voters)	DA Votes: (% of voters)
97091703	Northwood Community Hall	1322	49% (2698)	32 (2%)	1253 (95%)
97091714	New Woodlands Christian	1385	49% (2827)	22 (1%)	1300 (94%)
97091747	Heinz Park Primary	1552	45 % (3448)	531 (34%)	959  (62%)
97092007	Phillip K Primary	796	24% (3317)	757 (96%)	24 (3%)
97092287	Temporary Voting Station	1284	40% (3210)	1215 (95%)	60 (4%)
97093323	Sports Complex	426	37% (1152)	385 (91%)	33 (7%)
97093334	Lutheran Comm. Centre	247	30% (824)	235 (95%)	10 (4%)
		7012*	40% 17476	3177 (45%)	3639 (51%)

*Includes 77 spoilt ballots

  

From the figures above we can see that the “community breakdown” will look something as follows:

	Philippi	Mitchell’s Plain	Heinz Park
Registered voters	49%	32%	19%
Voters stayed away	67%	51%	55%
ANC	94%	2%	34%
DA	5%	95%	62%

All figures were rounded up

The elephant in the room: race

The glaring reality remains that the overwhelmingly (+/-94%) of voters in communities, who do go to the polls, vote according to a specific party i.e. Mitchell’s Plain (DA) and Philippi (ANC).

However, a trend that seems to be cutting across communities is that voters are not coming out to vote. The IEC is satisfied with this trend, as it attributes it to the normal trend in bi-elections. In fact, that 30% of registered voters in a ward can decide on behalf of the rest of the people of the ward who will be elected seems to be usual. Surely, this non-participation in the basic act of a democratic dispensation should raise alarm bells for the IEC but surely for the ANC as well?    

One hopes that given that this is a trend that now cuts across racial divides that this is another reason why the ANC should move away from the “woo the Coloured vote” campaign. Let’s woo the working class!

Myth 1: The DA has made inroads

It has been widely reported that the DA has made inroads into traditional ANC strongholds. This is simply not true. Zille reports that voters have turned their backs on the ANC because of a number of reasons. She mentions specifically Philippi and judging on the figures presented above we see that Philippi has anything but turned its back on the ANC (94%). The DA simply maintained its base in Mitchell’s Plain and made a few adjustments which were crucial, which we’ll come to in a moment.

Myth 2: The selection of the ANC candidate was the problem

The inability of the ANC in the whole ward to get a sense of voters would be a much more accurate way of describing what the problem could be. Local government elections are a strange creature in South Africa. One votes for the candidate (ward) and the party (proportional). One could say that the one is personal (candidate) and the other according to party. It is interesting to note that ANC supporters would sacrifice their ward just because they have personal challenges with the candidate selected. In other words, they are prepared to sacrifice the organisation because of personality.

On the other hand, no matter how strong a candidate’s community credentials the party (s)he stands for also counts. We have seen on a number of occasions how candidates who are prominent in the community lose an election because they were either in the wrong party or because they simply could not match the resources of the larger parties (ANC or DA). Of course, the opposite is the same as well. Weak candidates have won simply because of the organisation’s brand.

If it was the selection of the candidate, why did the REC or PEC not intervene (long) before the elections? Just as we can accuse supporters of the ANC for sacrificing the ward because they did not support the candidate, so too can we accuse the REC and the PEC of sacrificing the ward because they supported the candidate.

Among these challenges of not being able to read the voters of the ward is the challenge of the inability to go beyond traditional strongholds. Whilst the traditional stronghold of the ANC (Philippi) in Ward 88 carried 49% of the ward’s (potential) vote, in wards where the traditional stronghold is in the minority or even where there is a balance of power, there simply remains a desire to “defend strongholds”. We’ll never win elections by simply “defending strongholds”.

Lesson 1: The balance of power

It is important that even though we remain adamant to defend strongholds to seek the balance of power in any ward. Heinz Park, in this particular ward, was where the balance of power lay and the DA identified it spot on even before the elections (The Leagues form part of the Heinz Park voting district). Without being on the ground, one is able to say that the DA simply maintained its stronghold (Mitchell’s Plain) and identified Heinz Park as the balance of power (with a potential 19% of the total vote). If one had been on the ground before the election this prediction must have been made.

The DA knew that Heinz Park would tip the scales.  The Heinz Park voting district has a community where the traditional DA and ANC lines are blurred; people in The Leagues (DA) and people in Heinz Park itself (ANC). The DA knew where the balance of power lay and it’s time the ANC too identifies voting districts which can tip the balance of power in its favour.

Lesson 2: It’s not about race

As mentioned earlier, a clear demonstration in this election was that voters in ANC strongholds would have no qualms in not going to vote for the ANC. They would rather abstain than vote DA. One should therefore question how large this group of voters (of all races) are that they would rather abstain than vote DA. Dare I say, I believe this trend (rather staying away than voting DA) started with Coloureds and have now moved to African areas. This is the watershed moment.

In the LGE of 2006 there was a voter turnout of only 50%; the GE of 2009, a voter turnout of 80% (in the City of Cape Town), 20% stayed away, the ANC lost to the DA by 18% (in the Metro). In the LGE of 2011 there was a voter turnout of 65% (35% of voters stayed away). The ANC lost to the DA by 28%. 

Voters staying away from the polls seem not to be a concern to the IEC, though, as a Chapter 9 institution, it should be. Yet voters staying away from the polls should be more of a concern to the ANC because it gives them a target market.

Voters who stay away want to be impressed. They believe their vote must be earned. They are fundamentally against the DA that’s why they stay away rather than vote against the ANC. More importantly, they are now starting to cut across racial lines and it is almost certain that, after a bit more inquiry, they are in the main working class.

How do we win them?

A post-LGE 2011 brief was prepared and it will be repetitive to recall all the points here. However, it is simply about 1) a working class, not race issue; 2) a strong strategy in policy; 3) getting the right leaders (capacity); and, 4) communications, which is largely to do with political marketing.

All of this teaches us that voting districts become important in branch activities. However, voting districts do not work in a vacuum and therefore the higher one goes in the organisation the more sophisticated it must become. We need to start small but think big.

   

    

Marikana, my Marikana, we must never forget you

“My mother was a kitchen girl, my father was a garden boy, that’s why I’m a socialist.”

At the end of January 2013, the final report of the Farlam Commission of Inquiry into the Marikana Massacre will be submitted to the Presidency. Hopefully it will give us some idea of what happened on those fateful days when ordinary workers were killed.

What happened at Marikana was once again an expression of the structural violence that continues to exist in South Africa; the structural violence of inequality, unemployment and poverty, not forgetting racism and sexism. A violence that the Commission will hardly touch on in its final report.

Yet Marikana must make us reflect. In particular it must make us reflect on the silver bullet that seems to be our only solution to these problems. We are made to believe that if we wish to solve unemployment, well then jobs is the answer. If we wish to address inequality, then jobs is the answer. If we wish to eradicate poverty, well, you’ve guessed it, jobs is the answer. Yet it is not – as we saw in Marikana.

These were workers. Whether unionised, or “rogue” unionised or not unionised at all. They were in the most: workers. There have been suggestions that some were not workers but by and large the struggle at Lonmin, as is the struggle at most of our mines (or is it really “our” mines?), is a struggle waged by workers: better pay, better working conditions, better living conditions. They ask not for ownership of mines, though I think they have the right to demand this, and they do not demand exuberant salaries such as their management counterparts. They simply demand a decent job, a decent life.

Gross casualization of jobs, underpaid jobs and job insecurity simply provide jobs but do not begin to address the challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. The Youth Wage Subsidy mooted by some within the Treasury and the Democratic Alliance do not give (young) people either the security and/or the sufficient means to live decent lives. Neither will labour brokers, relaxing labour laws nor weak trade unions.

Countless times one has heard of the ineffectiveness of internships (serving tea and cleaning offices rather than acquiring skills) and this does suggest that skills and/or the necessary experience will not automatically be imparted on young people through this subsidy. What a scheme such as the subsidy will certainly do is inject public funds into the assets of the company and thus improve the company’s liquidity and thus share prices will rocket. The only people to benefit directly from such a program would be the share-holders.

Even more so, the working class, especially those seasoned workers who are employed, are right to fear that such a scheme will undermine their rights and their bargaining chip. It will undermine the decent jobs that already exist because it will be easier to employ two youths, casualised and paid a pittance, than to pay the decent salary of one worker.

One of the lessons that we must learn from Marikana is that jobs, in themselves, are not the end. They are the means to what is meant to be a decent life. Decent jobs give us a decent life. A simple, insecure and exploitative job will give us an insecure and exploitative life. Even slaves had jobs.

The struggle song quoted in the beginning of this article is often sung at revolutionary gatherings. Maybe it’s time we started to sing: “My mother was unemployed, my father was a mine worker, that’s why I’m a socialist, I’m a socialist, I’m a socialist!”

A decent job secures a decent life which leads to a decent death. The martyrs of Marikana bear witness to this basic truth.    

     

   

"Ungovernable" and democracy. Can the two co-exist?

The ANC identified as one of its weaknesses the emergence of “…a new type of ANC leader and member who sees ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism and in-fighting as normal practices and necessary forms of political survival…” Indeed, one of the greatest challenges that the movement faces is the question of ill-discipline.

Some would suggest that it is a new phenomenon in the ANC. Others would point to the Polokwane Conference and remind us of how delegates showed disrespect to the leadership at the time whilst the future leaders sat idly and allowed for the ill-discipline to continue. This ill-discipline was in the favour of the post-Polokwane leadership and therefore they did nothing to quell the unruly behaviour. Needless to mention, that that same ill-discipline has come back to bite the current leadership in its weak spots.

Yet this blog has suggested that this ill-discipline set in even earlier. When writing on Frank Chikane’s Eight Days in September it pointed to an incident in the NEC meeting of March 2002 which indicated this high level of ill-discipline. Comrade Mandela, in his ex-offcio capacity, attended the NEC meeting of the ANC and challenged the leadership collective on their stance on, what was then termed, HIV-AIDS denialism. Comrade Mandela, it is said, was ridiculed, attacked and even at one stage called a liar.

Apparently, Comrade Mandela was so shocked at the behaviour of the leadership that he retreated from the organisation only to attend special events. The Big 6 at the time, with Comrade Mbeki as president, Comrade Zuma as deputy and Mosioua Lekota as chairperson of the meeting sat by and did absolutely nothing whilst this icon of the struggle against Apartheid and one who gave 27 years of his life for our freedom was vilified by the leadership of the very organisation he had helped to build. Comrade Mandela then realised that something had gone terribly wrong with the ANC.

For his lack of leadership then, because the ill-discipline was in defence of him, Comrade Mbeki would have a taste of this and would meet it face to face in the NGC of 2005 and then finally at the 52^nd National Conference of the ANC in Polokwane. By then, the leadership at the highest level of the ANC, had become comfortable with the emergence of this “…new type of ANC leader and member who sees ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism and in-fighting as normal practices and necessary forms of political survival…” because it was working in the favour of those who sort to be elected. No doubt, this same leadership is now haunted by the very same type of ANC leader and member as the ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism and infighting continues as the normal practices and necessary forms of political survival as the movement treads towards the 53^rd National Conference in Mangaung.

This same ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism and infighting seems to be spilling over into our national politics. No longer confined to the ranks of the ANC we are told, though we must view these reports with extreme caution, that the service delivery protests are fundamentally being fuelled not by the lack of service delivery but by factions of the ANC. Again, how true this is, only the ANC can answer.

Yet whilst these may be questionable, what is not is the ANCYL in the Western Cape coming out and suggesting that they would make the province ungovernable. However legitimate the struggle of the working class, it is important to note that to all intents and purposes the National Democratic Revolution has the word “democratic” in the centre of it. We are not engaging an illegitimate provincial government here. It was legitimately elected by the people of the Western Cape and to suggest that the province be made ungovernable (which is a loaded political science term) would be to suggest that it lacks legitimacy.

We must realise that, say unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, we live in a democratic state. Despite its challenges of gross inequality, abject poverty and widespread unemployment, the gains made by South Africa in 1994 of political freedom, constitutionally enriched human rights and a political order that is democratic must be safeguarded.

Needless to mention that for the Left this raises philosophical questions of whether to recognise this democratic order albeit an order that is, for now, by and large in favour of those who have. At the same time, whilst it must use this privilege in moderation, the democratic state remains the sole entity that can legitimately employ violence. No one else may do so and certainly not the youth league of a party that is the official opposition in a province. Whilst we can understand working class violence, we may never in a democratic, and therefore legitimate, dispensation condone it.

Like ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism, the ANC leadership is allowing for this use of the word “ungovernable” in the Western Cape. Soon this campaign of declaring to make the province ungovernable would spread to other provinces and it will come to haunt the ANC leadership in the future. Ill-discipline, divisions and factionalism had to be nipped in the bud in its early stages, it wasn’t and has been able to threaten successive leaders; even leaders who used this unruly behaviour to their advantage. Just like this “make ungovernable” campaign has to be nipped in the bud, even though it is useful for the current leadership.

The easy task is to bring down a government. The more difficult one is to win democratic elections and stay in power, especially where competition is high. The more difficult task for the ANC in the Western Cape is to win an election, yet they chose rather to be bad losers and throw a tantrum.

Just like the unruly behaviour of some ANC leaders and members have come to haunt past and present ANC leaders so too will these words and actions of “ungovernable” come to haunt present and future leaders of the ANC.

P.S. Two days after my last post on The Question of Violence, dealing with violence in South Africa, the Marikana Massacre took place. Whilst our thoughts and prayers must be first and foremost with those who lost loved-ones and those who were injured, it is important that we take time too to reflect on this terrible tragedy. No doubt, we shall be putting fingers to keys in the future about this event when we have sobered a bit. 

The Question of Violence: Part II

South Africa and violence

Apartheid was subjectively and objectively violent. While all of the subjective violence, the deaths, the torturing, the disappearing, the army shooting in our townships, the dompass, have all been done away with the blatant reality of Apartheid’s objective violence remains. It is an objective violence that is real in its symbolic, systemic forms as well as having been normalised.

Even those who continue to suffer from racism, sexism, poverty, exclusion and lack of opportunity have been made to believe, by the pacifists within our country, that things are better now or, even worse still, that things were better under Apartheid. Don’t bring up the past, these pacifist exclaim. We have had freedom for 18 years, they remind us; whilst all along the objective violence remains intact.

Recently, on the occasion of his birthday, Comrade Mandela was criticised by some for being a “sell-out”. No doubt, many continue to believe that the decision to negotiate a settlement with the Apartheid regime was an incorrect one. Given that as early as the 1980’s “the talks about talks” were initially facilitated by big (White, Western) business in South Africa, one can understand why then already a distinction was made between political and economic emancipation. Are we surprised then as to who those were who led the Class Project of 1996?

Economic emancipation of the majority of people in South Africa, despite the gross injustices of the past and the twins of capitalism and Apartheid, was sacrificed on the altar of majority rule, human rights (excluding economic ones of course) and democracy. Then already political freedom was separated from economic emancipation in South Africa. To have separated these two would have been like negotiating a peace settlement in the Middle East, allowing for Palestinians to have East Jerusalem as their capital but not allowing Palestinian refugees to return to Palestine. Political and economic freedoms are intertwined and both remain at the heart of objective violence in South Africa today.

Egyptians, after the toppling of Hosni al-Mubarak, soon realised that their challenge was not just the toppling of one man. It had to be a toppling of the entire system. Most of those who participated at the forefront of the revolution in Tahrir Square would today question whether participating in a political system that had at its centre a state that was fundamentally designed to exclude and serve only the interests of the ruling elite, including the military.

In the early 1990’s, we thought that if we simply overthrew White minority rule, introduced democracy and replaced the Broederbond’s cadre deployment with our own that we would be able to use this Apartheid state apparatus; a state designed to exclude the majority of our people. We thought that if we transformed this state that it would miraculously act in the majority’s interest, especially the favour of poor people. As Marx and Engels warned, we had to replace the entire sinking ship all together.

As a result, the objective violent Apartheid state remains intact. It is a state that serves the minority, now who can afford it, Black and White. It is a state that excludes the majority in how it operates and prescribes rather than involves people in every single step of decision making. It is not a socialist state and it is not a democratic one. As before 1994, the Apartheid state apparatus remains a breeding ground today for corruption, inefficiency, ineptness and non-accountability.  

The response therefore to this continued state of objective, bourgeois violence is the subjective violence of the proletariat. Whether it is workers at Impala mine, students protesting on the campus of Walter Sisulu University, scuffles between DA marchers and Cosatu affiliated workers, crime in general or more importantly the on-going protests within townships and locations, thus far been term as “service-delivery protests”, these are all forms of the violence of the proletariat in response to the objective violence.

This subjective violence is in our language when we engage each other and hurl insults or when we make demands in the Western Cape, attaching words such as “ungovernable”. Whoever initiates these acts of subjective violence are primarily those who suffer from the objective violence of our society and are therefore only responding to it in the form of subjective violence.

A violent future?

As members of the Mass Democratic Movement it is therefore important that we be hesitant is simply condemning (subjective) violence. We must understand that these are justifiably the reaction to an objective, bourgeois violence that continues to persist in our society, even after nearly two decades of freedom. We must be vigilant not to separate ourselves from those who are so frustrated that the only voice they have is subjective, physical violence. Sadly, those who suffer the most from objective violence are often those who bear the brunt of subjective violence as well.

It is not important to decide whether Comrade Mandela sold us out or not. It is not important whether one condones violence, in either form, or not. What is important is that we realize that we need a fundamentally different way of thinking of the state, other than just to be happy with that which we inherited from Apartheid. We must realise that it is not just about implementing policies but that we radically need to change policies to ensure that the objective violence that persists in our society in tackled.

It is important that we be vigilant about not too liberally condemning acts of subjective violence committed by those who remain on the margins of our society. To condemn them would be to condemn the very poor we struggle to emancipate.

The words of Marx, Engels, Caudwell and even Dr King continue to ring out: “Since a dispossessed class will fight to the last ditch, while there is hope, how can the transition be affected other than violently…?” (Caudwell, 1938, Pacifism and Violence)

The Question of Violence: Part I

“Violence begets violence.”

These were words used by the American civil rights activist, Martin Luther King Jr. One could argue that though a pacifist, Dr King, believed in these words not only as a reaction to the War in Vietnam but also in relation to the unjust system that was (and continues to this day) to oppress people of colour in the United States.  

In their conclusion of The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, articulate, what some have termed as, a call to violence. They conclude the work by particularly using the following words:

“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.” (Marx and Engels, 1848, The Communist Manifesto)

Some scholars have interpreted this as a call to violently overthrow the state. Yet without going into a hermeneutical or exegetical interpretation of the text, it is important, at least in this translation, to note that there exists an abhorrence for “…all existing social conditions…” and that the only way to defeat these unacceptable social conditions would be to “…openly declare that [Communist] ends can be attained only by forcible overthrow…” In other words, as Dr King would articulate, the violent system that exists, through abhorrent existing social conditions, can only beget a violent reaction.  

A violence that calls for more violence

In dismissing bourgeois pacifism, Christopher Caudwell writes in his work, Pacifism and Violence, that:

“…the only way to secure peace is by a revolutionary change in the social system, and that ruling classes resist revolution violently and must therefore be overthrown by force.” (Christopher Caudwell, 1938, Pacifism and Violence)

Yet again, in the tradition of Marx and Engels, Caudwell makes sure to distinguish between bourgeois violence and the violence employed by the proletariat. He defines bourgeois violence as that which: “…arises, just as does feudal or despotic violence, from the characteristic economy of the system.” He continues:

“…the whole bourgeois economy is built on the violent domination of men by men through the private possession of social capital. It is always there, waiting ready at any moment to flame out in a Peterloo or an Amritzar within the bourgeois State, or a Boer War or Great War outside it. As long as the bourgeois economy remains a positive constructive force, that violence is hidden.” (Christopher Caudwell, 1938, Pacifism and Violence)

Put differently, Caudwell states that the violence perpetrated by the bourgeois, the ruling class, is one that is primarily about the private possession of that which is supposed to be owned in common but more importantly that this violence is often systemic and therefore subliminal.

By dismissing bourgeois pacifism, Caudwell notes that time and again it is the pacifist who would oppose proletariat violence but at the same time “…refrain from opposing bourgeois violence, [because] he generates it, by helping on the development of bourgeois economy.” Could Dr King have been described as such a pacifist? A discussion we could have on another occasion.

Two types of violence

We are therefore to understand that there are two types of violence. The systemic and subliminal violence, as perpetuated by the existing social conditions of our neo-liberal and capitalist times, on the one hand, and the violence of the oppressed that comes in response to that ruling class violence, on the other.

To clarify this distinction better, we could employ the work of the Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic, Slovaj Žižek. In his work Violence (2008), Žižek makes a clear distinction between subjective violence and objective violence. Subjective violence describes the empirical violence that we might experience e.g. the suicide bomber, assault, murder, rape and war. It is physical violence, as it were, and often we are most fixated with this violence. We believe that peace is the absence of violence i.e. subjective violence.

However, objective violence is the violence that exists through an unjust system. It is symbolic and systemic; symbolic in language and in form, such as racism and sexism whereas it could also be systemic through economic and political systems, such as capitalism and its twin neo-liberalism. These causes of gross inequality and poverty, the exclusion of the vast majority of citizens in the operations of the state (or the market?) and the opportunity to reach their potential given only to a few, and not others, are only three examples of the systemic objective violence that exists in our current social conditions.

Hence Žižek’s thesis, like Marx, Engels and Caudwell, is that subjective violence is but only a response to objective violence. To give a current example, the subjective violence experienced by Syrians today are only in response to the objective violence that exists in the Middle East region: the question of Palestine, Western interests in the Middle East, among others.

At the same time, it is important to note that coupled with this understanding of violence, as subjective and objective, goes the comprehension of the process of ‘normalisation’. Given the subliminal, systemic and symbolic nature of objective violence it is easy for these to be ‘normalised’, i.e. it becomes part of the system, part of life. Why care about race or sexism, people ask these days, when minority rights, homophobia and environmental rights are much more threatened than the life or dignity of a person of colour? It’s much “cooler”, “in” or “fashionable” to fight against nuclear power stations, be a vegetarian and support gay marriage than it is to stand up against racism in Europe or the US.

Poverty, racism and sexism have become normal. People are told to live with it and get on with their lives. These objective violent acts are normalised i.e. made ‘acceptable’ just as the violent act of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is made normal. If we do it long enough, people will just not care any longer, think the Israelis. Given the subjective violent response to this objective violence, Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims are then characterised as terrorists, intolerant and fundamentalists; this profiling being an act of objective violence in itself.

Politics and Religion 1: The rise of the separation of church and state

Since the days of Martin Luther, the Reformation and nearly 200 years before the French Revolution was there the call for a clear separation between church and state; an almost integral part to modern democracy, some would argue. While one can acknowledge that it took those countries who were predominantly Catholic nearly 200 years for this church-state culture to set in, countries in the north of Europe, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, where the Reformation flourished, adopted this almost immediately. As a consequence, these northern European countries remain some of the most secularised countries in the world today.

One could argue that even to this present day former Catholic European countries, such as Spain, France and Italy, find themselves struggling with this clear separation between church and state. For example, France has decided that it is the philosophy of liberté, égalité, fraternité, born from the Enlightenment, which citizens of France have to profess in order to be French; not culture, language or religion.

In banning the public wearing of niqab, the French authorities ordered French Muslim women to “liberate” themselves from garments, such as niqab, and thus ensure “equality” with all other (non-Muslim French) women. That some of these Muslim women freely chose to wear niqab and that through this banning their “liberty” was being limited was of no consequence to French authorities.

In Italy, the 2011 case Lautsi vs Italy before the European Court of Human Rights somewhat described the entire continent’s rollercoaster experience with religion and secularism, state and church. Crucifixes were being displayed in public (state) schools and the Lautsi’s took umbrage because they wanted their children to be (educated) free from religion. They therefore demanded that the school remove the crucifixes, the school refused and the matter went to court. The Italian Court found in favour of the school arguing that the crucifix was a cultural rather than religious symbol. In other words, an Italian court decided that pivotal to Italian culture, no matter what the background or region, was the symbol of the crucifix.

The Lautsi’s then proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights arguing an infringement on the rights to freedom of thought and education. This Court agreed with them but on appeal the Italian state won again given that the Court argued that member countries (of the European Union) had a differing “margin of appreciation”. In other words, a crucifix meant more (culturally) to an Italian than it did, say, to a Swede or German and even a French, given the laïcité principle.

The two cases illustrate the type of debate that has been on-going in Europe for a few years, maybe even since the founding of the EU in the early 1950’s; a question not of the separation between church and state but rather church (religion) and politics, church (religion) and culture.

Is it possible to be European and not realise the fundamentally Christian roots that Europe enjoys, given that it was once called “Christendom”? Just like Greece is a fundamental part of Europe? In fact some would even argue that values such as liberté, égalité, fraternité and even democracy itself are fundamentally Christian concepts albeit products of the Reformation. Who would forget the case of Turkey and their wish to enter the EU? Apparently they were just not “European” (read: Christian) enough.

Secularism has its roots in the Reformation and subsequently the Enlightenment but secularists in Europe today struggle to juggle the Christian roots that Europe enjoys, the influx of Islam and the demands to separate church (religion) from state. For sure, given both cases cited and how they were concluded one questions whether there is simply a demand to ensure that Europe keeps Islam in check while maintaining its Christian roots.

The scenario teaches that there would seem to be a clear difference between the separation of church-state relations and church-politics relations. The former seems to be the easier while the latter poses as a struggle not only in Europe, “exporter of democracy”, but also in the United States and other democratic countries, including South Africa. Society-state issues are at play and fundamentally how society has the ability to shape the state and, almost obviously, vice-versa.

Given the Arab spring and the call for liberté, égalité, fraternité in these countries as well as the subsequent rise of Islamic (“fundamentalist”) regimes through democratic means, e.g. Egypt, Gaza, Pakistan, it would be interesting to see how democracy twins with the local religious and political culture.  

One can easily legislate separation of church and state but in dealing with political culture, which is often influenced by religion and which one cannot control, it becomes a bit more complicated.

Our Iron Lady

Earlier this year, I read a biography of David Cameron [DC], the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and leader of the Conservative Party. Believing in the maxim: "Know Thy Enemy!", my interest in DC comes at a time when Tories are governing the country through a necessary coalition with the Liberal-Democrats, under Nick Clegg, after being in opposition for 13 years; opposition in three consecutive Labour government terms. The coalition should prove a bit more interesting in the coming months given the challenges the UK has with Europe and Europe always affects the UK, whether Britons want to believe this or not.

Yet what really interests me is the fact that DC was able to scrape through the 2010 General Election after his party took three defeats at the General polls (1997;2001;2005). The ANC in the Western Cape can learn a lesson or two not only from the Conservatives post 1997 but even from the Labour Party. Labour was in opposition for 18 years before they came into power in 1997, under Tony Blair.

DC comes from a rather wealthy background, his wife from an even wealthier one and this is something that haunts him. He is said to be aloof, arrogant and out of touch with those whom his cuts really affect. His father was a financier, stock broker-cum-banker and it is this privileged background that gave DC both a headache on his way to claim the Tory leadership in 2005 but also crawling towards victory of the premiership in 2010. 

Even worse was his association with Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism. If DC, who wears the pants in the Cameron-Clegg marriage, is known for his cuts, cuts, cuts and more cuts to public spending then it is vintage Margaret Thatcher. In fact, he tried and is trying to go even further and privatise not only public services but civil society itself; quintessential Thatcherism.

But this then sparks an interest for Maggie herself. If Maggie is the one DC goes gagga for, then surely it is useful to try and understand the Iron Lady. She got this title from the Soviets while still in opposition, who meant it as an insult, but who the mother of modern day political spin was able to keep as a compliment, at home. DC was a protégé of Maggie but not exactly because they hardly worked together, as say Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki did. To understand how Mbeki thinks, one had to look into Tambo’s direction. Cameron never admitted to be a Thatcher fan but certainly there were signs of it during his Oxford days.

Cut a long story short, Maggie was able to defeat Labour in a number of successive general elections (1979;1983;1987). Not only did she earn her nickname by the way she handled domestic troubles: the riots of the early ‘80’s, how she related to the trade unions, how she dealt with Northern Ireland, the international community and everything else but also the way she dealt severe blows to Labour in elections.

The intrigue though comes with her downfall. The Iron Lady fell after her party imploded. Labour, the unions, terrorists/freedom fighters in Northern Ireland and the Soviets were all unable to do what her own party did: unseat her. It was her own party that slammed the door on her. Differences with her party emerged not only on policy but also with her attitude. Her deep differences, for example, on Europe coupled with her self-confidence, bordering on arrogance, caused the rebellion within the Tories, Labour needed.

John Major won the next election riding on Thatcher’s wave and by shining in Rupert Murdoch’s light. But yes, the end of Thatcher meant the end of the Tories and they continue to struggle to this day, hence their struggle to victory in 2010.

We have our own Maggie Thatcher. She runs the Western Cape and, like Thatcher, is the lonely woman, by design, in a rather male world. Her policies, and that of her party, are not far from Thatcher’s: individual opportunism, dislike of trade unions, favouring capital, entrench past privileges, divide and rule, and best of all, spin!

People hated Thatcherism but loved the woman. She had charm, she had balls and she was nice – but that’s where it stopped and people didn’t look farther than these. But then her colleagues got fed up with her, her policies, her attitude and her stink – and they got rid of her.

No doubt, our Iron Lady will probably go the same way. The majority of people who vote for her don’t know the policies she promotes and the privilege she defends but this is for sure: she is their darling. On twitter, on Facebook, on botox, our Iron Lady in the Western Cape, is just “with-it” and people do go gagga for her. She is witty, she is bright (pun intended) and she has style.

The leader of the Official Opposition in the Western Cape, who is also a woman, can learn a thing or two from this Iron Lady it’s been said before. Point being: as long as she is in the running things, it would seem that the opposition in the Province will remain in their side of the House. Until, wait for it, her party implodes, has had enough of her arrogance (which she has a klomp of) and gets rid of her. Be assured, the DA is as divided as the Tories were in the ‘80’s; it’s deep down.

The WC Iron Lady turned 60 this year by 2014 she’ll be 63 and by 2019, 68. The Opposition in the WC stands a chance therefore for 2019 but the ground work starts now. In the meantime, they should prod and target the whims of the Iron Lady, guys she has as henchmen. Of course, building the organisation as well will be important as Blair did before 1997 and certainly which Cameron is struggling to do.

P.S. My calling our home grown Iron Lady by that title is as complex as it was in Maggie’s day: a blue compliment mixed with red insult.